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Japan's economy and society face a rapid aging of the population. The propor- 
tion of the elderly (defined here as those 65 years of age or older) in the total 
population, which was 4.9 percent in  1950-very  low by  international stan- 
dards-rose  to 14.8 percent in 1995. The ratio is projected to rise further, to 
over 25 percent by 2020, which would make it among the highest in the major 
OECD countries.' The rapid aging of the Japanese population reflects the high 
rate of  economic growth during the postwar period and associated structural 
changes in industry and society, particularly in family structure. 
This paper focuses on the economic status of the elderly, with specific refer- 
ence to their family relationships. First, the transformation of  the Japanese 
household structure in  the postwar period is reviewed. Second, the income 
of  elderly households under both conventional and alternative definitions is 
compared with that of average households for a better understanding of their 
relative economic status. The distribution of the income and wealth of elderly 
households is a major concern here. Third, the high proportion of the elderly 
living with their children, though declining steadily over time, has been a par- 
ticular characteristic of  the Japanese family. Major factors determining the 
coresidence of  the elderly with their children are analyzed based on cross- 
sectional data by prefecture. Finally, we arrive at some policy conclusions from 
the above discussions. 
Naohiro Yashiro is professor of economics at the Institute of International Relations, Sophia 
University. 
Financial support from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and technical assis- 
tance from the Japan Center for Economic Research are gratefully acknowledged. 
1. The relatively fast aging process in Japan is evident when we compare the time required to 
double the share of  the elderly from 7 percent to 14 percent in various countries. In Japan, this 
doubling is projected to take only 25 years, compared with 70  years in the United States, and 130 
years in France. For an overview of the economic aspects of the aging of  the Japanese population, 
see OECD (1990) and Takayama (1992). 
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4.1  Changes in Living Arrangements of the Elderly 
The aging of the Japanese population has been due largely to the gradual 
aging of the postwar baby boom cohort (born between 1947 and 1949), which 
will become elderly toward the year 2020. The rapidity of the aging is due 
mainly to the continuous decline of the birthrate, from 4.5 in 1947 to 1.43 in 
1995. In addition, an increase in life expectancy has contributed to an increase 
in the average age of the population; the average life expectancy of those reach- 
ing age 65 rose from 11.5 years in 1950 to 16.7 years in 1994 for males and 
from  13.9 years to 21.0 years for females. This extension of  life expectancy 
has greatly affected the living arrangements of the elderly in Japan. In  1990, 
85 percent of  elderly  men  lived with their wives (including those who also 
lived with other family members), while only 42 percent of  elderly women 
lived with their husbands, reflecting the large difference in life expectancies 
and the low divorce rate.? 
A major characteristic of Japan’s family structure is the high proportion of 
the elderly who live with their children or other relatives, indicating the im- 
portant role of extended families in securing a comfortable life for the retired 
elderly. For example, only 15 percent of all elderly women in Japan lived alone 
in  1989-much  lower than the 41 percent in the United States (table 4.1).3 In 
addition, the more aged the elderly become, the more likely they are to live 
with their extended families. 
Moreover, the likelihood of coresidence of elderly women is relatively high; 
62 percent of “very elderly” (those aged 75 or over) men and 77 percent of 
very elderly women live with their families in Japan, compared to 9 and 22 
percent  in the  United  States, respectively. While the greater likelihood  for 
women is partly due to the fact that elderly women are on average older than 
elderly men, the incidence of elderly women living with their children is con- 
sistently higher than that of elderly men in the same age groups; for example, 
over 80 percent of Japanese women aged 80 or over live with their children, 
compared with 70 percent of men in the same age group. This high rate of 
coresidence of elderly women with their children helps to reduce the incidence 
of poverty among the elderly in Japan. 
The living arrangements of the elderly, which have important implications 
for their economic position, have continuously changed over time. The share 
of  the elderly who live with and are supported by  their children in the total 
number of  elderly declined from 56 percent in  1977 to 39 percent in  1991, 
consistent with the decline in the share of  extended families in  total house- 
2. In  1993, Japan’s divorce rate (the number of  divorces per  1,000 population) was  1.53. This 
compares with 1990 divorce rates of  4.73 in the United States, 2.88 in the United Kingdom, and 
2.20 in Sweden. 
3. These figures do not include the elderly who are institutionalized. According to the Census 
of the Population in  1990, 4.3 percent of the total elderly population was institutionalized. Table 4.1  Distribution of Living Arrangements of the Elderly (percent) 
Men  Women 
With  All  Children’s  With  All  Children’s 
Age  Spouse  Alone  Relatives  Family  Nonrelatives  Spouse  Alone  Relatives  Farnly  Nonrelatives 
Age 65i 
United States  15  16  1  2  40  41  11  2 
Age 65-74 
United States  80  13  5  2  51  33  14  2 
Age 75i 
Japan  32  6  62  4.5  0  8  1.5  77  58  0 
United States  61  22  9  2  24  51  22  3 
Japan  31  5  51  36  0  18  15  61  47  0 
-  ~ 
Japan  41  5  54  31  0  24  16  60  39  0 
-  - 
~  - 
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Historical development of living arrangements of the elderly  Fig. 4.1 
Source; Ministry of Health and Welfare (1 989). 
holds. At the same time, the share of the elderly living alone rose from 8 per- 
cent to 12 percent (fig. 4.1). 
Various signs suggest that this trend is likely to continue in the coming de- 
cades. First, the share of extended families in total households in rural areas is 
consistently higher than the share in urban areas and is inversely related to the 
size of the city; the share of extended family households in small cities is twice 
as large as that in large cities. Second, nearly half of farming households are 
extended families, in both urban and rural areas; this share is much higher than 
the shares among nonfarm self-employed and employee households (fig. 4.2). 
Both continued  urbanization-migration  from rural to urban areas, particu- 
larly large cities-and  the associated contraction of  the agricultural sector as 
it is replaced by the manufacturing and service sectors should contribute to a 
further decrease in the share of extended family households and an increase in 
the incidence of single elderly households. 
Improvements in the social security and welfare systems have also contrib- 
uted to the increased incidence of the elderly living alone and have allowed for 
other, diversified  living arrangements.  Instead of the  traditional type of ex- 
tended family in which household members’ incomes are pooled, the elderly 
can live economically independent from their children while sharing the house 94  Naohiro Yashiro 
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Source  Ministry of Health and Welfare (1989) 
or housing  space (‘‘quasi coresidence”),”  or they can live alone in either the 
same neighborhood or the same town as their children. Indeed, the pattern of 
living arrangements evolves from the elderly living apart from their children 
but in the same neighborhood toward coresidence as they age. As a result, the 
accumulated level of the various types of elderly living arrangements (fig. 4.3, 
solid line) is flatter than the closer coresidence type (i.e., living together in the 
same house) across various age groups (fig. 4.3). 
The wide divergence in the living arrangements of the elderly between Japan 
and the United States and how these arrangements have evolved over time has 
various analytical and policy implications. In an extended family, the economic 
independence of household members varies with age: Of  males aged 40-59, 
over 90 percent earn the largest incomes in the household; they are normally 
heads of household. However, the ratio declines steadily with age, to 23 per- 
cent of males aged 80 or over; the remainder are economically dependent on 
their children. 
4. In typical examples of quasi coresidence the child’s family lives in a small house built in what 
was a yard next to the parents’ house, or the extended family occupies a multilevel dwelling in 
which parents  and children  maintain  separate  households  by  living on different  floors of  the 
same building. 95  The Economic Position of the Elderly in Japan 
4.2  Income, Consumption, and Wealth of the Elderly 
4.2.1  Income of the Elderly 
The economic status of  the elderly vis-i-vis the nonelderly has important 
implications for social policy and the system of transfers from the nonelderly 
to the elderly. Comparing ordinary household income (excluding single house- 
holds) by  age of  household  head  indicates that elderly households  (defined 
here as those 70 years of age or older) have incomes equivalent to 79 percent of 
average household income (table 4.2). If we exclude the self-employed, whose 
reported incomes are less accurate than those of salaried employees, the rela- 
tive income of the elderly household falls further, to 60 percent of the income 
of the average employee household. The incomes of single elderly households, 
which usually belong to the poor group, were approximately 60 and 70 percent 
of the average, for males and females, respectively. 
The large income difference between households headed by the elderly and 
average households, however, is subject to the following qualifications: First, 
elderly households  are smaller; the  average number  of  members  in  elderly 
households was 2.9 compared with 3.8 in all households in 1989. Accounting 
for the difference  in family size, the per capita income and consumption  of 
the elderly household exceeded those of the average household, though scale 
economies of household consumption should be accounted for.'  Second, self- 
employed incomes may not be fully declared, particularly by farming house- 
holds. Elderly workers are found most often in the self-employed sector; close 
to  60  percent  of  elderly  workers  are self-employed, though  self-employed 
workers account for less than 30 percent of all workers. This high incidence of 
self-employment among elderly workers may well lead to an underestimation 
of average elderly income. 
Finally, the income gap between the elderly and the nonelderly  would be 
even smaller if  imputed incomes from nonmonetary  sources were accounted 
for as follows: First, the ratio of homeownership for elderly households is gen- 
erally higher than the national average (80 percent vs. 60 percent in 1989). In 
addition, elderly people who bought their houses in the past have more unreal- 
ized capital  gains  from continuous  land  price hikes.  Both  factors  result  in 
larger housing and land assets for the elderly, on average two times those of 
the nonelderly (see table 4.2). Second, the elderly are intensive users of medi- 
cal benefits,  and most such use takes the form of  in-kind transfers from the 
government; the average per capita medical expenses of the elderly are approx- 
imately five times  as large as those of  the nonelderly. Accounting for these 
5. To compare per capita household income and consumption by  family size, a family of two 
has 5 percent lower per capita income than a single person and 12 percent lower per capita con- 
sumption, implying a scale merit of household consumption of 7 percent. A family of four has 30 
percent lower per capita income than a single person and 49 percent lower per capita consumption 
(Ministry of  Health and Welfare 1989). 96  Naohiro Yashiro 
Table 4.2  Relative Economic Position of the Elderly (average household = 100) 
Total Ordinary Household  Total Excluding Self-Employed 
Annual  Housing  Annual  Housing 
Age  Income  Consumption  Assets  Income  Consumption  Assets 
Age 60-69  92.3  91.8  140.9  82.7  90.8  142.5 
(per capita)  (1  12.2)  (1  11.7)  (1  13.3)  (124.3) 
Age 70+  79.1  77.2  183.1  59.7  66.9  179.1 
(per capita)  (102.9)  (100.4)  (93.9)  (105.2) 
Single Household 
Males  Females 
Annual  Housing  Annual  Housing 
Income  Consumption  Assets  Income  Consumption  Assets 
Age 60-69  73.8  81.2  487.6  94.6  91.3  110.3 
Age 70+  60.5  76.3  201.6  72.3  91.0  235.3 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1989) 
sources of imputed income would significantly improve the relative economic 
position of the elderly. 
4.2.2  Distribution of Income and Wealth of the Elderly 
The comparison of income and wealth between the elderly and the nonel- 
derly indicates that the economic position of the average elderly household is 
no less advantageous than that of the average nonelderly household. However, 
as in other industrial countries, the income and wealth of the elderly appear to 
be less equally distributed than those of  the nonelderly  (Tachibanaki 1989). 
While the elderly head 18 percent of households, 35 percent of elderly house- 
holds are in the lowest income quartile, compared with 13 percent of nonel- 
derly  households.  Moreover,  the  income  distribution  of  the  elderly  is  U- 
shaped, contrary to the traditional normal distribution pattern (fig. 4.4). 
There are various reasons why income distribution among the elderly is in- 
equitable in Japan. First, while public pensions account for nearly half of aver- 
age elderly income, labor income still accounts for one-quarter, implying that 
whether one can continue working beyond retirement age, subject to health as 
well as employment opportunities, is an important factor (table 4.3). Second, 
under the seniority-based wage structure prevalent in the Japanese labor mar- 
ket, not only does the average wage of employees grow with age but the disper- 
sion of wages in the same age group becomes wider. Because the size of the 
firm pension  or lump-sum severance payment is proportional to a person’s 
wage at the time of retirement from the firm,  differences in wages continue to 
be reflected in income differentials after retirement. Third, because many el- 
derly women were either homemakers or unpaid family workers, their eco- 97  The Economic Position of the Elderly in Japan 
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Source: Management and Coordination Agency (1989). 
nomic positions often depend on family situations, such as whether they live 
with their extended families, with their spouses, or alone. In 1989, the average 
income of  an elderly man living alone was 40 percent of  that of  an elderly 
couple (without children), while that of an elderly woman living alone was 36 
percent that of an elderly couple.6 
Housing assets are even less equitably distributed than household income. 
While housing and land assets account for much of the wealth of the elderly, 
the value depends on accumulated potential capital gains in previous periods. 
The median housing asset of the elderly (those 70 years of age or older) is 50 
percent larger than that of the average household, and the gap widens in the 
third quartile to 150 percent, indicating that the housing asset distribution by 
age group is wider in the higher asset-holding class. In addition, even among 
the elderly, the distribution of housing assets varies across regions, particularly 
between large cities and rural areas. For example, the average value of housing 
of the elderly in the Tokyo area was twice the national average in 1989 (Man- 
agement and Coordination Agency 1989). 
4.2.3  Savings of the Elderly 
One of  the major issues concerning Japanese household behavior is how to 
explain its high rate of savings. Numerous studies have been published giving 
possible reasons for the difference in the average rate of savings between Japan 
and the United States.’ One of the factors that raises average Japanese house- 
hold savings is the relatively  high rate of  savings of  the elderly, who are ex- 
6. Here, the single elderly  are defined to be those aged 60 or over, and elderly couples are 
defined to be those families in which the husband is aged 65 or over and the wife is aged 60 or 
over (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1989). 
7. See Horioka (1990b) for a survey of the major literature on Japan’s high savings rate. 98  Naohiro Yashiro 
Table 4.3  International Comparison of Major Sources of the Elderly” Income (percent) 
United 
Japan  United States  Kingdom  Korea 
Major Sources 
of Income  1981  1986  1990  1981  1986  1990  1981  1990  1981  1990 
Wages  31.3  24.5  23.8  15.2  14.1  10.7  6.5  5.5  16.2  31.9 
Public pension  34.9  53.4  54.3  53.9  53.0  55.2  64.0  68.8  0.8  2.5 
Private pension  3.8  1.9  1.9  10.0  10.4  13.6  13.5  18.0  0.0  0.3 
Deposit  2.1  2.2  2.0  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.6  1.3  2.2  1.9 
Other wealth 
income  5.3  5.6  4.0  14.5  17.4  11.0  2.2  1.9  3.3  4.6 
Support from 
children  15.6  9.0  5.7  0.3  0.2  0.7  0.5  0.1  72.4  54.8 
Income 
maintenance  1.2  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.4  1.4  3.1  2.3  1.2  2.2 
Others  3.1  1.9  1.8  3.5  2.4  2.7  2.6  0.9  3.2  1.6 
None ofthe above  2.7  0.4  5.7  0.2  0.3  3.0  6.1  1.3  0.6  0.2 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Life und View of  the Elderly (in Japanese; Tokyo; Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1992). 
“Age 60 or older. 
pected to be dissavers. Major explanations for the high rate of elderly house- 
hold  savings  in  Japan  are  later  retirement  from the  labor  market,  greater 
incentive to leave bequests to their children, significant imputed incomes, and 
absorption of the poor elderly into their children’s households (Horioka 1990a). 
First, the life-cycle theory states that people start to dissave after retirement. 
A simple explanation of the high savings rate of the Japanese elderly is that 
many of  them continue to work after normal retirement age. Though labor 
force participation  rates of the male elderly fall with age, the decline at age 
60-the  normal retirement age from a company-is  relatively small, and be- 
yond age 60 the participation rate falls only gradually; the average participation 
rates for those aged 60-64  and 65-69  in 1992 were 72 and 59 percent, respec- 
tively (fig. 4.5). Moreover, declining labor force participation rates bottomed 
out and then rose from 1988 to 1992, partly reflecting tightening labor market 
conditions. If this new trend toward later retirement continues, it may have a 
significant impact on Japanese household savings. 
If Japanese household savings rates are examined by age group in employee 
household data (the most readily available and thus the most often cited statis- 
tic), elderly household savings rates are found to be as high as 50 percent (fig. 
4.6). This surprisingly high rate of savings is attributable to the fact that only 
the rich elderly remain employed while continuing to be household heads; they 
accounted for 15 percent of those aged 65-69  and only 5 percent of those aged 
70 or older. On the other hand, the retired elderly (those who do not work) do 
dissave in Japan as the life-cycle theory predicts. Combining these employee 
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Source; Management and Coordination Agency (1989). 
though not to a negative level, which is similar to what occurs in the United 
States. 
A principal factor behind longer retirement life is the continuous extension 
of Japanese life expectancy;  expected life remaining at age 65 increased by 
4.9 years for males and 6.7 years for females between  1950 and  1993. This 
increase forces the elderly to save more in order to finance their longer lives. 
Another factor accounting for the large aggregate household savings (National 
Account  basis)  is the  large  fraction  in  the  elderly  labor  force  of  the  self- 100  Naohiro Yashiro 
employed,8  whose business profits are often mixed with household savings and 
for whom retirement is quite flexible, unlike the case of  employees subject to 
mandatory retirement.9 
Second, the desire of the Japanese elderly to leave bequests to their children 
is also important in explaining their later retirement and relatively high rate of 
savings. A survey by the Bank of Japan in 1990 indicated that the majority of 
Japanese parents who have financial and real assets want to leave bequests to 
their children. The share is higher among the older generation and among self- 
employed, particularly farming, households. The bequest motive, however, can 
be altruistic or strategic. While 60 percent of the elderly responded that they 
would leave the bequest unconditionally,  the remainder  said that they would 
do so only if  their children  agreed to take care of them in their retired  life 
(Management and Coordination Agency 1992). 
Third, the significant imputed income of the elderly raises their savings rate 
as conventionally measured. When we account for estimated imputed income 
and consumption from housing and land, as well as medical benefits, the sav- 
ings rate of the elderly falls, resulting in a consumption pattern resembling the 
life-cycle pattern. In addition, if household expenditure for education, which 
is conventionally defined as consumption, is reclassified as savings for human 
capital investment  in the family, it raises the savings rate of  the nonelderly, 
while having little effect on the rate for the elderly. Also, by  so doing, the 
mysterious decline in the household savings rate for those aged 40-49  (when 
the household’s burden of educational expenditure is largest) disappears, and 
we are left with a smooth life-cycle pattern of savings in Japan (fig. 4.7). 
4.2.4  Age Selectivity Bias 
The sharp decline in the economic independence of the Japanese elderly as 
they age is a major source of the “age selectivity bias” in Japanese household 
statistics concerning the income and savings of the elderly that makes it diffi- 
cult  to compare the  economic position  of the elderly  in Japan with that of 
the elderly in the United States. The extent of this age selectivity bias can be 
approximated by the gap between the age composition of the population and 
the age composition  of heads of households.  For example, 70-year-olds ac- 
count for 13.2 percent of the population above age 30, but only 7.8 percent of 
household heads (table 4.4). This age composition gap is much smaller in the 
United States. 
The likelihood that the Japanese elderly will be economically dependent on 
8. The rates of labor force participation of the male elderly (those aged 65 years or older) in 
self-employed and employee households in 1991 were 72 and 40 percent, respectively. However, 
with a declining self-employed elderly population, mainly concentrated in agriculture, the average 
labor force participation rate of the elderly is likely to fall in the long run. 
9. The age of mandatory retirement from a firm practicing long-term employment is set on a 
firm-by-firm basis. In 1991, over 90 percent of Japanese firms had this system, and half of them 
set retirement age at 60 or older. Unlike in the United States, this mandatory retirement system is 











.  ...,,.......  \ .... ,...........-..A  -... 
/- 
21  '  1  I  I  I  I 
-30  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70+ 
Age of head of household (employee+non-worker) 
Fig. 4.7  Alternative definitions of household savings rates (excluding the self- 
employed) 
Source: Management and Coordination Agency (1989). 
Table 4.4  Comparison of Age Compositions of the Population and of Heads of 
Households between Japan and the United States, 1989 
Japan 
Age  Population 
30-39  22.7 
40-49  26.6 
50-59  21.4 
60-69  16.0 
70+  13.2 
Total  100.0 
United States 
Households  Age  Population  Households 
27.0  25-34  27.9  23.9 
29.3  35-44  23.1  22.9 
21.2  45-54  15.8  16.0 
14.7  55-64  13.7  14.6 
7.8  65-74  11.5  13.3 
75 +  8.1  9.3 
100.0  Total  100.0  100.0 
Sources: For Japan, Management and Coordination Agency (1989); for the United States, U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports (Washington, D.C., 1989). 
their children or relatives, and will thus be omitted from statistics compiled on 
a household  basis, is closely related to their income level. Three-quarters of 
the elderly who have annual incomes of less than 400,000 yen live with their 
children, which results in an upward bias in the perceived elderly household 
income because it is the relatively rich elderly who can afford to remain heads 
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Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1989). 
income level and incidence of coresidence with children disappears when in- 
come level exceeds 2 million yen, implying that the decision of the elderly to 
live with their children may be independent of their income level unless their 
income is so low that they have few choices. There is even a positive correla- 
tion between elderly income level and incidence of quasi coresidence (shown 
by  the gap between the two lines in fig. 4.8). Thus, while coresidence is more 
prominent for the poor elderly, quasi coresidence, which assures privacy while 
maintaining the benefits of coresidence,  is more associated with the rich el- 
derly. 
There are various ways to cope with this age selectivity bias (Ando, Yama- 
shita, and Murayama  1986; Hayashi  1986). Hayashi (1986) estimated the in- 
come and consumption of  the elderly living with their children as the differ- 
ence between the income and consumption of extended families taking care of 
elderly  members  and  those  of  nuclear  families.  We  basically  follow  this 
method with various modifications, such as estimating the savings rate of the 
“hypothetical” elderly group, who are actually absorbed in their children’s fam- 
ilies, by equating the age compositions  of  the population  and of  household 
heads (Yashiro and Maeda 1994).’O With this adjustment, the savings rate of 
elderly households (aged 70 or older) is estimated to be -93  percent-that  is, 
they consume nearly twice their own incomes. The large negative savings of 
the  elderly  living  with  their  children  is  not  surprising,  given  their  low  in- 
comes.” 
10. This assumes that the elderly who depend economically on their children are statistically 
independent  household heads. Including these hypothetical  household  heads with low savings 
greatly lowers the average elderly household savings rate. 
11. The large negative savings rate of the elderly living with their children is consistent with the 
following estimates of a loglinear equation based on the income and consumption data of nonearn- 
ing households in 1989 (Yashiro and Maeda 1994): 103  The Economic Position of the Elderly in Japan 
This result has two implications. First, the savings behavior of the Japanese 
elderly is not necessarily  different from that of the U.S. elderly, but the large 
gap in rates of coresidence with children tends to overstate the difference. Sec- 
ond, the falling incidence of coresidence  with children among the Japanese 
elderly is likely to lower their savings rate in household-based  statistics and 
thus narrow the gap with the United States. 
4.3  Determinants of Living Arrangements of the Elderly 
The living arrangements of the elderly play a key role in determining their 
economic position as well as their household savings. We already observed in 
section 4.1 that the percentage of the elderly who live with their children rises 
with age. Also, the percentage of coresidence is higher for women, those who 
are without a spouse, those in farming households, and those living in rural 
areas; since the very old are more likely to be women and spouseless, these 
variables are not mutually exclusive. 
Various studies indicate that the effect of economic factors, particularly the 
income level of  the elderly, on their living arrangements is indecisive. Many 
previous studies attribute the increasing ratio of elderly persons living alone 
to their rising income level. According to this view, the poor elderly must live 
with their children for financial reasons, even though they do not wish to do 
so. In contrast, the school of the strategic bequest  motive  argues that many 
adult children live with their elderly parents for financial reasons-they  cannot 
afford to buy their own homes. In return, the elderly parents expect in-kind 
services as well as monetary support from their adult children. For this reason, 
it may well be the rising income of children that will lower the likelihood of 
shared living arrangements. 
4.3.1  Review of Previous Studies 
Kotlikoff  and Morris (1988) presented  a model of family living arrange- 
ments in which the joint utility maximization between elderly parents and their 
adult children  was explored.  In the model,  the economic gain from shared 
housing was compared with its disutility in determining  whether the parent 
and  child  would  live  together.  For  example,  when  parents  would  like  to 
coreside, but their children would not, the parents were able to bribe their chil- 
dren to coreside if their income, including housing services, was high enough 
relative to their children’s income. A major conclusion of this study was that 
nonmonetary  characteristics  of children  (such as gender and education)  are 
In PTC = 3.63 -  0.282 In DI,  R2 = 0.791, 
(41.03)  (5.50) 
where PTC  is propensity  to  consume, DI is disposable income, and figures in  parentheses are 
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more important than income differences as determinants of  living arrange- 
ments. 
With specific reference to Japan, Ando et al. (1986) compared the behavior 
of extended nonelderly families and nuclear nonelderly families. Their conclu- 
sion was that the larger the assets of the elderly, the lower their probability of 
living with their children, because the rich elderly tended to live alone. In con- 
trast, Otake (1991) indicated that both the assets and the income of  elderly 
parents increased the probability of  coresidence with their children, mainly 
because of the parents’ strategic bequest motive. The implications of these two 
results differ widely: Ando et al. implied that the current tendency of elderly 
incomes to rise, partly as the result of improved social security benefits, would 
lower the probability of  coresidence, while Otake’s conclusion was  exactly 
the opposite. 
4.3.2  Empirical Specification 
The living arrangements of the elderly are explained by the incomes of the 
elderly and their adult children, housing services, and other family characteris- 
tics. The source of the data examined in this paper is the Basic Survey on the 
People’s Life (BSPL), which was conducted nationwide by  stratified random 
sampling in 1986 and 1989 by  the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
The  1986 and  1989 BSPL were based on  about 40,000 randomly selected 
households. Because microdata were not available, the pooled data for 47 pre- 
fectures in 1986 and 1989 were used instead. 
Table 4.5 shows the estimates of the living arrangements of the elderly. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of the elderly living with their married children 
and sharing income and consumption to the total elderly.12 The elderly living 
with unmarried children were removed from the sample to eliminate cases of 
unmarried youths living with their parents until marriage. Elderly people living 
with their married children are classified by  age group. Almost 30 percent of 
the elderly (those 65 years of age or older) in 1990 were self-employed. Since 
self-employment incomes are difficult to measure, household consumption is 
used as a proxy for permanent income. Consumption in households where the 
head is aged 40-49  is used as a proxy for children’s income. Housing services 
are represented by  the area of  the house divided by  the number of  “tatami” 
mats (about 1.7 square meters each) per household member. 
Major findings are the following: First, the higher the income (approximated 
by household consumption) of the elderly, the greater the probability of coresi- 
dence, which is consistent with the result obtained by Otake (1991). The extent 
of this income effect, however, declines with age, implying that the effect of 
12. This is the narrowest definition of coresidence and is different from quasi coresidence (i.e., 
living  together  in the  same living  unit  but  maintaining  independent  family  budgets)  used  in 
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Table 4.5  Determinants of Coresidence" 
Consumption  Consumption  Housing  1989 
Age Group  Constant  of the Eldrely  of Supportersb  Spacesc  Dummy  R2 
60-69  -5.187  2.984  -2.31  1.564  -0.345  0.583 
(0.293)  (5.446)  (-3.580)  (4.540)  (-5.32) 
(0.130)  (8.034)  (-3.983)  (4.032)  (-5.349) 
70 +  0.315  1.263  -0.89  0.648  -0.201  0.718 
Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1989). 
Note: Figures in parentheses ate r-values. 
"he  ratio of the elderly living with children to the total number of elderly having children. 
hAverage  consumption of the age group 40-49  (10,000  yen per month). 
1.7 m'  per household number. 
higher elderly income used to bribe children into coresidence diminishes with 
age, mainly because elderly income levels fall with age. Second, the higher the 
children's income, the lower the probability of their living with parents, which 
is consistent with what Kotlikoff and Morris (1988) implied. The greater inde- 
pendence of children with higher incomes would encourage their living alone, 
particularly in present-day Japan, where values differ widely between genera- 
tions, in part, because of the vastly different societies in which the generations 
grew up. However, the extent of this negative income effect also declines with 
the age of the elderly, partly because the deteriorating health of a parent may 
depress economic incentives. Finally, better housing  services, measured by 
larger space per household member, result in less congestion and more privacy, 
thereby stimulating coresidence. The effect again becomes relatively small as 
the age of the elderly increases. 
The conclusion, based on prefectural data, that higher income of the elderly 
raises the probability of  coresidence with their children could be  subject to 
sample selection bias because the elderly who are economically independent 
tend to be richer in prefectures with a higher incidence of coresidence. How- 
ever, the level of  elderly consumption by  prefecture is negatively correlated 
with the ratio of elderly household heads to the total elderly population."  This 
effect is mainly due to the fact that prefectures with a relatively high ratio of 
elderly household heads are generally poor regions in Japan, indicating that 
this sample selection bias is not necessarily significant when prefectural data 
are used. 
13. Consumption of elderly households (C)  is explained by the ratio of elderly household heads 
to total elderly (H)  using data from 47 prefectures in both 1989 and 1990 as follows: 
In C = 4.012 -  0.262 In  H -  0.100 D,  Rz = 0.183. 
(32.10)  (4.38)  (3.37) 
where D is a dummy for the year 1990. Figures in parentheses are r-values 106  Naohiro Yashiro 
4.5  Summary and Conclusion 
The pattern of Japanese family structure has been marked by a high number 
of extended families living together. This characteristic indicates that the role 
of the family in securing a comfortable retired life for the elderly is quite im- 
portant in Japan and is a major source of “age selectivity bias” in household- 
based statistics. The economic position of the elderly and their savings rate as 
conventionally measured are largely overstated because these data tend to ex- 
clude the poor elderly who are economically dependent members of their chil- 
dren’s families. This not only explains why the savings rate of the Japanese 
elderly is so much higher than that of the U.S. elderly but also predicts a de- 
cline in savings rate in the near future given the persistent increase in elderly 
persons living alone. 
The economic position of the Japanese elderly on average is almost equiva- 
lent to that of the nonelderly. In addition, accounting for imputed income fur- 
ther narrows the gap between the elderly and the nonelderly. While the income 
of  the majority of households headed by  the elderly may be low, their asset 
level is significant, thanks to past asset inflation in Japan, so that the elderly 
may persuade their children to live with them by offering rich housing services. 
Empirical estimates suggest that this strategic bequest motive may well be im- 
portant in determining the living arrangements of the elderly, despite their chil- 
dren’s feelings about shared living. 
Finally, the income and wealth distribution of the elderly is much wider than 
that of the nonelderly and is more concentrated in the lower income classes. 
This implies that welfare policy targeting the elderly per se would be ineffi- 
cient, particularly given increasing fiscal constraints. The policy of concentrat- 
ing welfare resources on the poor elderly, rather than on the elderly population 
as a whole, would be effective. 
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